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I. Introduction and Background. 
 
I would like to take the opportunity of this workshop to be more personal and introspec-
tive than I generally am (at least in writing). I do so in the hope that my experiences and 
perspectives might be useful to others who are working with treaties. I realize there is 
an enormous variety in our college teaching jobs in terms of teaching loads 
(quantitatively and qualitatively), research expectations, etc. However, I believe most of 
us are asking similar questions and operating in environments with comparable 
opportunities and constraints. 
 
When I started graduate school (at the University of Washington) in 1967, I had a vague 
notion I wanted to study something international and that I wanted to use quantitative 
methods.i I took the standard first term courses and had space for one elective. I chose 
a survey of international law taught by Peter Rohn, an associate professor in the 
Department of Political Science. I was a top student in methods courses from the begin-
ning (I had had differential equations; most of the other students did not know what dif-
ferential equations were). I liked international law from the beginning, but it took a cou-
ple courses before I felt comfortable with the subject and started to think I might make it 
the focus of much of my research. I was too naïve to see the difficulty of combining my 
two principal interests, quantitative methods and international law, an unlikely juxtaposi-
tion to say the least. 
 
Because of my mediocre grades as an undergraduate at the College of Wooster, the 
University of Washington gave me no money my first term quarter.ii Teaching assistant-
ships were gone for that year, so I started looking for other possibilities. Peter Rohn was 
trying to start something then called the “Treaty Information Project.” I had taken Rohn’s 
survey course in international law and two seminars on international law by the end of 
my first year in graduate school. He told me about the project for which he had not yet 
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secured any funding. I was intrigued by the issue with which Rohn was wrestling: Trea-
ties are interesting, important, and readily available. How do we move beyond the nar-
row, clause-by-clause view common in legal analyses of treaties? Certainly treaties 
were better indicators of country behavior than many of other measures political scien-
tists were relying on. As Rohn put it: 
 
Treaties were an obvious target in the search for relevant data. Treaties pervade the international 
system. They are important. They are made with care.  They are recorded and published. They 
are relatively easy to standardize and categorize, and hence to quantify and cross-relate.iii 
 
Between my first and second years in graduate school, Professor Rohn secured a large 
grant from NSF (about $2.5 million in 2006 dollars) to establish a center that would 
examine large numbers of treaties and store information about them on the university’s 
mainframe computer. I was in the right place at the right time and got in on the ground 
floor of this endeavor. I spent more than a year working 20 hours a week “coding” trea-
ties from the United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS). I read literally thousands of treaties 
inductively developing a good feel of the range and variety of these things called trea-
ties. My induction was impure— induction usually is— because I already knew a lot 
about treaties; McNair was a household name for meiv and I had studies the “treaty on 
treaties” emerging from the Vienna Conference.v Many people found treaty-coding mind 
numbing; I loved it. I am infinitely curious and noticed a variety of patterns because I 
had enough time to read the treaties to satisfy my curiosity about almost anything, e.g., 
what are the differences between written Dutch and Afrikaans.vi Further, since part of 
Rohn’s project was to track the changing patterns of country relationships to treaties, I 
could apply what I had learned about signature, ratification, accession, and succession 
to treaties. I was forced to appreciate what I should have learned in graduate courses: 
to understand any treaty, one must know both the black letter law provisions and the 
complex set of state relationships to the treaty. Shortly thereafter, I was introduced to 
reservations, the subject of my dissertation and a focus of subsequent work. Perhaps 
half of my research has dealt with treaties, albeit with very different foci.vii 
 
I worked for Rohn for about a year in what by then was called the Treaty Research 
Center. In 1969, the University of Washington School of Law lured Professor William 
Burke from Ohio State. Burke already was a leading scholar on the law of the sea. 
When the National Sea Grant Program started, Burke had money to study ocean-
related treaties and asked me to work for him.viii I did so for my last 1½ years in 
graduate school and learned a good bit about the law of the sea, a very “hot” area 
because the movement to hold a Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea to replace 
the flawed 1958 Conventions was gaining momentum.ix I learned a lot from Burke and 
took international law courses in the law school. In the middle of graduate school, I 
accepted a summer job at the Center for Naval Analyses in Washington, DC. The work 
there dealt with the 3rd UN LOS Conference, specifically how conference negotiating 
could be understood to protect the interests of the U.S. Navy. 
 
I wrote my dissertation about multilateral treaties, using Rohn’s data for the period 
1945-1965. I got my Ph.D. in 1971 and took a position at the University of Rhode Island 
teaching mostly in their interdisciplinary Master of Marine Affairs program but also in the 
Department of Political Science. Much of my teaching related to the law of the sea but 
within the context of U.S. oceans policy. After less than seven months as Assistant 
Professor of Marine Affairs, an unexpected death caused the University of Rhode Island 
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to offer me the position, Associate Director of the Law of the Sea Institute (LSI). I ran 
their conference in June of 1972, successfully, I guess, because by June of 1973 I 
found myself Executive Director of LSI. 
 
LSI was a very successful operation respected around the world as a neutral forum. We 
had considerable soft money to run an annual conference and workshops most of which 
focused on the UN LOS Conference; my treaty interest had narrowed to the negotiation 
of one very important treaty. For three years (until I left to come to Penn State), I was in 
a superb position to watch the development of one of the major treaties of the 20th cen-
tury. Delegates from most countries came to Rhode Island for our conferences. I negoti-
ated the first attendance by representatives from the USSR and the Peoples Republic of 
China—a big deal in the 1970s. I got to know hundreds of delegates from scores of 
countries as I attended conference sessions in New York, Geneva and elsewhere. The 
LSI position provided an unprecedented opportunity to observe a major negotiation from 
many different angles. I felt I had the best of all worlds. I could go to Washington and 
talk to the U.S. State Department officials, but also had access to UN officials and many 
national delegations. People thought I knew more than I did so I was asked to speak at 
defense colleges, universities in the USSR, etc. In less than a decade, I learned a lot 
about treaties from numerous, complementary perspectives. 
 
In 1976, I left the University of Rhode Island and came to Penn State where I have been 
ever since. My Penn State location, Behrend College in Erie, is a liberal arts-like college 
(now about 4,000 students) within the massive 24-campus Penn State system. Behrend 
has a substantial research expectation, but an expectation that is qualitatively different 
from that of many large research universities including Penn State’s “main campus” at 
University Park. To cite two examples, I get about the same credit for a textbook as for 
a research monograph and as much credit for an article in the German Yearbook of 
International Law as I would for International Organization.x Several other aspects of my 
position at Penn State Erie made it easier for me to sustain my interests in treaties. I 
was able to develop an undergraduate course on International Law, fairly unusual in 
smallish undergraduate programs.xi About the year 2000, I developed a one-credit hon-
ors seminar on treaties. The idea was to reach several audiences including bright 
freshman from any discipline, political science majors, and students who might want to 
work on the CSDMT. This semester (Fall, 2006) I have added a bit of quantitative meth-
ods to the treaty seminar. We do not require any quantitative methods for our political 
science major; many students select political science in part because they wanted to 
avoid quantification. No doubt the nature of my position has made it easier for me to 
sustain my research interest in treaties. 
 
My current research focus on treaties, the Comprehensive Statistical Database of Mul-
tilateral Treaties (CSDMT), is described in some detail in the subsequent section. This 
project is a product of my orientation and background. I believe treaties are interesting 
and important. In a sense, treaties are my dependent variable; although, if treaties are 
the only variable examined, the issue of dependent or independent variable is moot. 
Treaties are a good example of a complex, real world phenomenon where cause and 
effect reverse themselves. It is reasonable to assume it takes a certain amount of trust 
before states enter into multilateral treaties. If those treaties function well, trust will 
increase predisposing additional treaties addressing more subject areas.xii I have made 
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a value judgment that treaties, ipso facto, are significant. Further, I believe, if more peo-
ple understood the number of treaties operating and the range of norms prescribed, the 
international system would function better. 
 
II. The Contours of the CSDMT 
 
When Professor Peter Rohn began his major effort to quantify treaties he wrote: 
 
Our ignorance of basic facts is impressive. For example, nobody knows how many treaties there 
are in the world today or how many there were 10 or 20 or 50 years ago. Nor is it known how the 
world’s treaties subdivide by signatories, topics, title, duration or reliance on international 
institutions, dispute settlement procedures or by any other criterion.  Most of these matters are 
considered relevant to a legal analysis of any one treaty. And yet they are ignored in the global 
context of all treaties.xiii 
 
This lack of a broad, macroscopic perspective on treaties is due in part to the fact treaty 
scholarship has been dominated by lawyers and law professors some of whom are 
almost allergic to quantification. How dare we reduce the subtlety and complexity of a 
300-page instrument to a few variables some of which seem arbitrary! The answer of 
course is that in-depth analysis of a 300-page treaty is enhanced by macroscopic 
analyses; it is easier to understand individual treaties if one has some idea of the forest 
in which these treaty trees grow. Prudence is the order of the day; Harvard Professor 
and PCIJ Judge Manley O. Hudson, who, among myriad other accomplishments, tabu-
lated treaties, said “Count, by all means count, but count things that count.”xiv  
 
The CSDMT originated in 1998 with a review I prepared of Christian L. Wiktor, Multilat-
eral Treaty Calendar, 1648-1995 (1998) for the American Journal of International Law.xv 
I gave the book a very good review. It was the most comprehensive record ever com-
piled of all multilateral treaties and it covered 350 years and more than 6,000 instru-
ments. One of the best honors students I have ever taught was in my office looking at 
the Calendar; he asked me broad questions, e.g., how many multilateral treaties have 
been signed (sic) over the last 400 years. I could not answer his questions. It occurred 
to me, if I could get a group of very good students together, we could produce a data-
base starting with the Wiktor book. It was fortuitous that, in the fall of 1999, my college 
of Penn State had a group of honors students willing to undertake this project. Over the 
years, the project has grown in breadth and depth. We have checked many treaty series 
and indices to be sure we have included virtually all multilateral treaties. We had to 
develop a reasonable approach to what constitutes a multilateral treaty, e.g., omitting 
declarations, final acts. A quantum leap in the project occurred when we decided it was 
necessary to locate the text of each treaty to add information not obtainable from 
indices and other compilations.  
 
Development of the CSDMT had to be realistic. We did not have soft money and could 
not compete with research centers that specialize on a particular subfield of interna-
tional law, e.g., human rights law. Given the fact this was a cottage industry financed 
only with internal Penn State funds, we could only afford to spend perhaps 30 minutes 
on each treaty. We do not collect the two kinds of information most people think of when 
they envision a treaty: fulltext and a complete list of parties.  
 
We have collected basic information (variables) for 6000-7000 multilateral treaties 
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signed during the 500 year period, 1500 and 2000. I selected variables that were 
straightforward, important and significant from an international law perspective. 
 
• Headnote 
• Name of instrument 
• Nature of instrument: amendment, protocol, and questionably binding 
• Regional focus 
• Treaty series and location 
• Laterality (plurilateral/ general) 
• Signature date 
• Force date 
• Relation to IGOs 
• Topic category #1 (UN's about 300, e.g., whaling) 
• Topic category #2 (about 30, e.g., maritime/oceans)  
• Topic category #3 (about 10, e.g., economic) 
• Dispute settlement provisions 
• Reservations provisions 
• Duration clause (for the treaty) 
• Duration clause  (for parties) 
• Length of text 
• Official languages 
• Code number: a rational numbering system for all multilateral treaties 
III. Illustrative Findings from the CSDMT—Three Examples 
 
A. 500 years of treaty-making: the broadest picture 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of 500 years of multilateral treaty-making, necessarily a 
macroscopic picture. Treaties are placed on a timeline according to signature date, the 
most accurate, least ambiguous way of displaying trends in treaties. Since multilateral 
treaties were concluded at a far faster rate after 1900, we have lumped all treaties 
before that date into a single group (the leftmost bar in Figures 1 and 2); there were only 
470 treaties signed over the 400-year period, 1500-1899. Treaties from 1900-1999 are 
displayed in equal time periods of 20 years to facilitate comparison and analysis. 
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Figure 1
Trends in Multilateral Treaties, 1500-1999
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Most treaties are what we call “original instruments” represented by the larger solid 
bars. These treaties are not explicitly linked to, or dependent upon, earlier treaties. The 
majority of treaties are original instruments and most of these are relatively insignificant, 
ad hoc actions that have no possibility of triggering a derivative treaty. However, there 
are many treaties that, while they must be accepted by state parties to enter into force, 
are dependent upon and/or derivative from earlier treaties.xvi These include protocols, 
amendments, and extensions. Some are significant, others trivial, but they clearly are 
qualitatively different from the original instruments. We use the term, “supplementary 
instruments,” to describe these. Another important finding from Figure 1 is the relative 
frequency of supplementary instruments. The pattern here is quite clear and probably 
confirms the intuition of many who have studied treaties. The portion of supplementary 
instruments is about 10–12% through 1920, increasing thereafter. By about the 1950s, it 
levels off and remains fairly constant at about 30%. 
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Figure 1 permits a much more precise statement about aggregate trends in multilateral 
treaty-making. Many scholars assert— usually based on no more than a hunch— that 
the glory days of treaty-making have passed. Usually they do not say exactly how they 
know.xvii The data from the CSDMT help us to formulate a more precise statement: The 
greatest level of activity in terms of new treaties occurred around 1970 with the 
rate declining somewhat thereafter but remaining at a high level compared to all 
the rest of the 20th century. Further, since the 1950s, more treaty activity has 
taken the form of supplementary instruments.  
 
B. Changing Patterns in Language Choice 
 
Figure 2 deals with an interesting issue, but hardly one in the realm of high politics. It 
shows trends over 500 years in the use of official or authentic texts of the treaties. This 
can be an emotional issue, since language often is an element of nationalism. It is inter-
esting to go beyond the obvious, i.e., negotiating states can do whatever they wish in 
selecting languages.xviii McNair, the leading treaty expert of his generation, said only 
that “parties are free to choose the language or languages in which a treaty is 
expressed.”xix Treaties involving many parties create problems in deciding which 
national languages to use. One solution, famously ignored by the European Union, is 
adopting a lingua franca. As Nicolson noted: 
 
Until the eighteenth century the common language, or lingua franca, of diplomacy was Latin. Not 
only did diplomats write to each other in Latin but they even conversed in that medium. Such 
treaties as those of Westphalia (1648) . . . were all drafted and signed in Latin and that was in 
fact the general practice.xx 
 
Eventually Latin was replaced by French because of “the political ascendancy of France 
under Louis XIV.”xxi Most scholars would agree that “French has lost its dominant posi-
tion as the diplomatic language and, since 1919, English has become at least as 
important,” a supposition proven by Figure 2.xxii The increased importance of English, 
mostly at the expense of French, is even more dramatic in bilateral treaties.xxiii  
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Figure 2:
Trends in Language Choice
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Three broad conclusions emerge from Figure 2. First, to the consternation of President 
deGaulle and Premier Lévesque, the use of French has decreased drastically. For the 
1500-1899 interval, 71% of treaties used only French compared to 4% for 1980-1999. 
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Second is much greater use of the English language both as the only authentic text and 
along with French for many bilingual treaties. For the earliest time period, English was 
an official language in only 5% percent of treaties, while it has become an official lan-
guage in 85% of treaties in the most recent period.xxiv A democratization in language 
choice has emerged with more treaties selecting the language of all parties or the five or 
six languages of the UN. For the most recent time period, 39% of treaties fall into these 
“democratization” groups. 
 
C. Duration and Importance: Towards Weighting Treaties 
 
Figures 3 and 4 begin to address one of the most difficult problems facing the CSDMT 
project. The principal strength of the CSDMT probably is complete coverage, i.e., the 
project has virtually all multilateral treaties, but how does one accommodate the incredi-
ble diversity of these 6,000 treaties? They range from trivial trilateral agreements man-
dating minor changes in behavior lasting only for a few months to treaties such as the 
UN Charter that changed the contours of the international system, endured for decades, 
and created permanent institutions. Some of this stems from the legal milieu in which 
treaties are negotiated and studied. Like the sovereign equality of states, treaties, once 
in force, are assumed to be equal. Confounding the situation is the fact that thousand of 
multilateral treaties remain legally in force long after they have ceased to have any 
effect on state behavior. A permanent “solution” to this problem will take a concerted 
effort and many years. Reasonable assumptions are possible. For example, it is logical 
to assert that the importance of a treaty is the product of: 
 
   • what it obligates states to do 
  • how many states are so obligated 
  • the duration of the obligation 
 
Operationalizing this scheme might be impossible; it certainly would be a major meth-
odological task. Even attempting it would infuriate many lawyers and probably would not 
satisfy political scientists. 
 
I undertook a modest test, really an experiment, where I tried to accommodate duration 
and importance level. I examined all original instrument, general treaties signed 
between 1900 and 1999, about 600 treaties in total. I read through the information col-
lected for each and developed a simple scheme that, after several revisions and false 
starts, seemed to fit the treaties. Importance levels (values) assigned were: 
 
 
 
       DESCRIPTION    NUMERICAL   % IN 
               VALUE     CATEGORY  
 
       low       1       45% 
       med./low     2       21% 
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       med.       3        15% 
       med./high     4       10% 
       high       5         6% 
       system changing     10         3% 
 
I also made judgments about the duration of each treaty. Most had a significant effect 
only for their signature time interval, but some seemed to have an influence continuing 
into the future. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that this scheme is a tentative first 
step. It certainly will need to be refined. 
 
 
 
Figure 3
Trends In General Treaties, 1900-1999
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Figure 3 follows a format identical to that of all previous figures except the 1500-1899 
interval has been omitted. It shows the number of new treaties signed during each of 
five equal time periods from 1900 through 1999 and includes only general treaties that 
are original instruments for a total of 609 treaties. The graph shows a huge increase in 
activity after 1919 peaking in the 1960s or 1970s and a significant decrease thereafter. 
This trend is consistent with the pattern seen in Figure 1 and has been offered as 
 11
“proof” that the heyday of treaty-making has passed.xxv 
 
Figure 4 shows the same subset of the CSDMT as Figure 3, but, this time, importance 
weightings and duration are taken into account. The values on the y-axis become an 
index of the aggregate effect of treaties operating for each time interval, rather than a 
simple count of treaties. The values were calculated by taking the numerical value for 
each treaty and adding it to each time period for which it was judged to apply. For 
example, the UN Charter, signed in 1945, has a value of 10 as a system-changing 
treaty. Ten would be added to 1940-1959 and to the two subsequent time periods. 
 
 
Figure 4
Cumulative Effect of General Treaties, 1900-1999
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Figure 4 shows quite a different picture than Figure 3. There is a steady increase in the 
effect of treaties until about 1960 and a plateau thereafter without the decrease seen in 
the other formulations. The overall conclusion is markedly different. Figure 3 posits 
decreasing importance for treaties, while Figure 4 shows a very high level has been 
attained and sustained. I believe Figure 4 is the more accurate description of global 
treaty-making, but realize my methodology can be questioned. In defense of that meth-
odology and the information it coaxed from the data, I believe, if anything, it understates 
the cumulative effect. Taking the example of the UN Charter, it probably is more than 
ten times the importance than the modal treaty that has a value of 1.0. Furthermore, 
important treaties tend to have longer durations, although “importance” and “duration” 
need to be considered separately. 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
I have already confessed my prejudice in favor of treaties. I believe that, if more Ameri-
cans understood treaties and how they operate including the national interest balance 
struck when treaties are concluded, American foreign policy would be more enlightened. 
A hundred years ago, the first article published in the American Journal of International 
Law, written by U.S. Secretary of State Elihu Root, was entitled “The Need for Popular 
Understanding of International Law.”xxvi For almost a century, many have accepted the 
desirability of educating a broader audience about international law, but how do we 
reach this goal? I believe part of the solution can be a better understanding of treaties, 
beginning with how many there are and how they create norms that all countries have a 
vested interest in following. The mass media tend to focus on a few conspicuous viola-
tions of treaties rather than on the fact that, in Professor Louis Henkin’s words, “Almost 
all countries obey almost all the rules of international law almost all the time.”xxvii This 
goal of better popular understanding of international law would be easier to accomplish 
if more undergraduate students took international law. I think an important question for 
the workshop to examine is whether participants teach international law and why.xxviii All 
of us carry out research in international law and, I assume, seek ways for our teaching 
and research to complement each other. 
 
It is unrealistic to think that all of us who do not teach international law will re-orient our 
teaching to do so. There are more modest steps we could take to cooperate in our 
research to make it easier to share information about treaties.  As a first step, I have 
suggested a common numbering system for treaties, rather like a Library of Congress 
number for treaties. Many compilations, if they have any system, simply number trea-
ties. Others, e.g., Wiktor’s Calendar, have no numbers. A system that is flexible, intui-
tive, and not too cumbersome might take this form: 
 
• First nine digits-- signature date: For example, 1958.0429 is April 29, 1958 
 
• 10th digit can be L (LNTS), U (UNTS) or X (other to be determined later) 
 
• 11th-15th digit will be LNTS or UNTS number or used differently for “X” treaties 
 
This would make it possible for us to communicate more effectively and to determine 
whether or not we are on the same treaty page, as it were. 
 
We know much more about treaties, especially multilateral treaties, than when Rohn 
first issued his warning.xxix The CSDMT project provides a clearer picture of 500 years 
of multilateral treaty-making and a good deal about magnitudes and trends in treaties 
along with information about languages, topic categories, regional vs. global 
approaches, etc. Many have speculated that treaty-making is in decline.xxx We have 
documented that this decline, if it exists at all, is modest and disappears entirely if one 
accounts for the importance level and duration of each treaty. There is a tendency to 
bounce between extremes with some saying international law does not exist and others 
expecting international law to an unerring guide for all state behavior. Judge Manfred 
Lachs described this swinging from one extreme to the other as being either a Utopian 
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or a denier.xxxi Figure 1 refutes the denier’s argument. Notwithstanding important 
deficiencies, an enormous amount of treaty law is in operation. As many of us 
investigate treaties in different ways with different research goals, we can collaborate 
and learn from one another, heed Judge Hudson’s warning,xxxii and improve the way we 
count. 
 
                                            
iAs an undergraduate at the College of Wooster I took a lot of mathematics, more than enough for a minor. 
However, the best professor I had at Wooster, the head of the mathematics department, almost threw me out of his 
office when I told him I wanted to study statistics. “Talented mathematics students do not waste their time on 
statistics,” he said. Probability was all right; I have never understood why. 
iiTuition was $140 per quarter with no out-of-state penalty. 
iii Peter Rohn, World Treaty Index 7 (vol. 1, 1983). 
ivA.D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (1961).  
v Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, # 18232. Entered into force 27 Jan. 
1980. The conference was held 26 Mar. – 24 May 1968 and 9 Apr. – 22 May 1969.  A/CONF.39/11/Add.2.  
viTreaties published in the UNTS are in some 140 languages basically any official text of the treaty. 
viiThe focus has been very different ranging from one treaty to thousands. For example. Gamble, "Reservations to 
Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice," 74 Amer. J.  Internat’l. L. 372-94 (1980) examines 
thousands of multilateral treaties; Gamble, "The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Binding Dispute 
Settlement?" 9 Boston Univ. Internat’l. L. J., 401-20 (1991) examines one treaty; Gamble, T. A.  Bailey, J. S. 
Hawk, E. E. McCurdy, “Human Rights Treaties: A Suggested Typology, An Historical Perspective,” 7 Buffalo 
Human Rights L. R. 33-54 (2001) examines human rights treaties. 
viiiAt the time, the University of Washington had a very effective grant getting machine. Except in agriculture, there 
was little competition in the state. Washington’s senators, Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson, were in the top ten 
in seniority, during this period. 
ixConvention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.  516 U.N.T.S. 205,  No. 7477. Done at Geneva, 29 
April 1958. Entered into force 10 September 1964. 
Convention on the High Seas. 450 U.N.T.S. 11, No. 6465. Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958. Entered into force 30 
Sept. 1962. 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.  559 U.N.T.S. 285,  No. 8164.  
Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958. Entered into force 20 Mar. 1966 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. 499 U.N.T.S. 311, No. 7302. Done at Geneva, 29 April 1958. Entered into 
force 10 June 1964. 
xI have published in both International Organization, German Yearbook of International Law 
xiFor a detailed discussion of where international law is taught, see John Gamble, Teaching International Law in the 
1990s (1993). 
xiiFor an excellent discussion see Eric Corty, Using and Interpreting Statistics (forthcoming 2007). 
xiiiPeter Rohn, “The U. N. Treaty Series Project As Computerized Jurisprudence, Tex. Int’l L. Forum 168 (1966). 
xivCited in Peter Rohn, Treaty Profiles 4 (1976). 
xv93 Amer. J. of Internat’l.  L. 565-6 (2000). 
xviAmong scores of examples: The “original instrument,” Treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE), 
w/protocols (8) and declarations (7).  Signed 19 Nov 1990, entered into force 09 Nov 1992, US Treaty Doc. 102-8 
(US TIF, Jan 1995) is linked to this supplementary protocol: Agreement on the provisional application of the treaty 
on conventional armed forces in Europe of November 19, 1990.  Signed 10 July 1992, entered into force 17 July 
1992, text can be found in BPP Misc. 16 (1992) 
xvii72nd Biennial Conference of the International Law Association, Toronto, 4-8 June, 2006. Panel, “Engaging 
Stakeholders in Treaty-Making  and Implementation,” statements by Ambassador Allan Gottlieb and Prof. Thomas 
Franck. (www.ila2006.org).  
xviiiThe Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties not surprisingly does go beyond technical considerations. Article 
13 states that “when a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is authoritative in each 
language.” 
xixMcNair, supra note 4, at 30. 
xxHarold Nicolson, Diplomacy 231 (1939). 
xxiLassa Francis Oppenhein, International Law: A Treatise 771 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955). 
xxiiEdward Brown, Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law 129 (6th ed. 1976). 
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